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The standard of living, measured as gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, increased dramat-
ically in Venezuela relative to that of the United States from 20 percent in 1920 to 90 percent in
1958, but since then has collapsed to around 30 percent nowadays. What explains these remarkable
growth and collapse episodes? Using a standard development accounting framework, we show that
the growth episode is mainly accounted for by an increase in capital accumulation and knowledge
transfer associated with the foreign direct investment in the booming oil industry. The collapse
episode is accounted for equally by a fall in total factor productivity and in capital accumulation.
We analyze Venezuela during the collapse episode in the context of a model of heterogeneous pro-
duction units were policies and institutions favour unproductive in detriment of more productive
activities. These policies generate misallocation, lower TFP, and a decline in capital accumulation.
We show in the context of an heterogeneous-establishment growth model that distortionary policies
can explain between 80 to 95 percent of the current dierences in TFP, capital accumulation, and
income per capita between Venezuela and the United States.
JEL classication: O4.
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11 Introduction
The process of economic growth in Venezuela in the last two hundred years represents an interesting
development experience since it encompasses periods of remarkable growth and collapse within a
short time span. Figure 1 summarizes the growth experience in Venezuela by documenting gross
domestic product (GDP) per capita relative to that of the United States from 1820 to 2009.1 There
are three distinct growth periods. First, a period of stagnation from 1820 to 1920 where relative
GDP per capita declined at the rate of the increase in the standard of living in the United States.2
Second, a period of remarkable growth where relative GDP per capita increased from about 20
percent in 1920 to more than 90 percent in 1958. Third, a period of remarkable decline where GDP
per capita decreased from its peak around 90 percent to about 30 percent nowadays. In this paper
we focus on the episodes of remarkable growth and decline. More specically, we ask: What factors
explain the remarkable growth episode between 1920 and 1958 and what factors explain the growth
collapse after 1958?
We rst layout a simple accounting framework to guide our search for the relevant factors account-
ing for the episodes of remarkable growth and collapse. We nd that the growth episode is mostly
accounted for by a substantial process of capital accumulation and knowledge transfer associated
with the fast expansion of the oil industry. During this period, the oil sector was open to foreign
investment and output production expanded at a fast rate. Public infrastructure projects com-
plemented the expansion of the oil industry. We nd that the collapse episode is accounted for
equally by a fall in total factor productivity (TFP) and a decline in capital accumulation. We
present substantial evidence of three sources of misallocation that may be at the core of the fall
in TFP and capital accumulation during this period: a government induced movement away from
oil activities, the government involvement in \big" industry projects such as steel, aluminium and
1GDP is measured in international dollars of 1990 and the data are from Maddison (2010).
2The period of stagnation (relative decline) is consistent with theories of dierential timing of takeo of modern
growth such as Lucas (2000) and Gollin, Parente, and Rogerson (2002).
2other heavy basic industries, and an overall government intervention in the allocation of factors
among economic activities through regulations, price controls, and intervention in credit channels.
To assess the quantitative impact of these policies, we consider a model of heterogenous producers
following Restuccia and Rogerson (2008). We nd that policy distortions can explain most of the
collapse in productivity and capital accumulation observed in Venezuela after the late 1950s.
Our paper is related to a large literature in macroeconomics and growth trying to assert the impor-
tance of factor accumulation and productivity in understanding income dierences across countries
such as Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997) and to a growing literature on the importance of pol-
icy distortions on aggregate productivity such as Restuccia and Rogerson (2008) and Hsieh and
Klenow (2009). For the particular case of Venezuela, our paper also relates to the \Dutch disease"
literature where the allocation of resources in the economy is aected by a booming exhaustible
natural resource sector such as oil.3 There is a debate whether the exceptional growth experience in
Venezuela from the 1920s and even the collapse experience since the 1960s can be reconciled with
the \Dutch-disease" mechanism.4 Our paper diers from this broad literature in that we focus on
the (mis) allocation of resources by the government who initially follows misguided public policies
and later faces a substantial boom in revenues.5
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section summarizes the main economic
environment in Venezuela since 1920 to nowadays. Section 3 lays out the accounting framework we
use and our main ndings. In Section 4 we describe the model and calibration. Section 5 presents
3See for instance Corden and Neary (1982). See also Sachs and Warner (1995) for empirical evidence on the lower
income growth rates observed in resource-abundant economies relative to other economies.
4See for instance Hausmann (2001). Rodr guez and Sachs (1999) oer an alternative explanation of the growth
collapse based on an optimal overshooting to the steady state equilibrium of consumption and investment in resource-
abundant economies. Another explanation based on the performance of the oil sector is in Hausmann and Rodr guez
(2006) who argue that the growth collapse is the result of the decline in per-capita oil rents, a fall in total factor
productivity, and the lack of specialization in alternative exports.
5We emphasize that in the \Dutch disease" model the appreciation of the real exchange rate is related to increases
in non-traded goods expenditures. Therefore, the focus should be on the impact of the boom in resource allocation.
This shift in focus is important in understanding Venezuela's growth experience because, as we document in the next
section, most of the resource allocation associated with the revenue boom was done by the government, as opposed
to by a market mechanism. See Bruno and Sachs (1982) for a related argument.
3the main experiments and results. We conclude in Section 6.
2 Venezuela's Economic Policies
Before 1920 Venezuela was a poor agricultural country exporting mainly coee, cocoa, and leather.
Starting in the 1920s and prominently since 1926, oil has been Venezuela's most important export.
The expansion of the oil industry was done through concessions for extracting oil to foreign com-
panies. The development of the oil industry generated not only a substantial process of capital
accumulation and knowledge transfer, but also promoted a process of socio-political modernization
and economic growth.6 The government received income from the oil industry mainly in the form of
revenue taxes and from selling rights (concessions) to private companies.7 The government, through
the allocation of oil revenues, had an important role in economic activity. For instance, from 1950
to 1957, Venezuela had a military government that encouraged industrialization by devoting a large
amount of public expenditures to the development of public infrastructure such as roads, highways,
seaports, and electricity plants. Whereas in 1950 Venezuela was among the South American coun-
tries with the lowest capacity of electricity generation, by 1959 it had the second highest capacity
due to an ambitious government plan of electrication. The plan was thought to be important for
the development of a strong manufacturing sector. Additionally, the government provided substan-
tial funds for industrial projects related to early stages of import substitution. Manufacturing and
Electricity-Gas-Water were the two sectors with the fastest growth in economic activity, reaching
average annual growth rates of 11.2% and 18.1%.8 During this period, there were profound changes
6See for instance Moron (1964) and Thorp (1998).
7In 1976, after negotiations with foreign oil companies, Venezuela's oil industry was nationalized. The conces-
sions of American and European companies were set to expire in 1983 and the Venezuelan government had to pay
compensation to the owners of the concessions.
8In addition, tax revenues from the oil industry increased during the 50s as a result of strong economic growth in
Europe and the US, the war in Korea, and the shut down of the Suez canal in 1956. At that time, the government
sold new concessions to compensate for the reduction in oil supply related to the Middle East turmoil which further
increased revenues.
4in the economy such as the massive movement of population out of rural areas: the proportion
of population living in rural areas in Venezuela was 80 percent in 1926 whereas by 1970 only 36
percent.9
The period of economic decline in Venezuela can be subdivided in two. In the rst period, from
1958 to 1973, the government moved beyond the development of public infrastructure projects to
a broad range of interventions in the economy and widespread protection of the domestic industry
through heavy regulation and import taris and quotas. In 1959, Venezuela's democratic govern-
ment created the National Planning Oce (CORDIPLAN) which postulated an import substitution
plan and the use of oil revenue for development that would bring about rapid economic growth and
structural social change in the long-term.10 CORDIPLAN main task was the design of ve-year
plans. Over the next 35 years, their basic aim changed minimally relative to the rst plan, which
postulated that the diversication of the economy from petroleum would guarantee both economic
and social development. In addition, the government increased its role in the nancing of industrial
projects through the creation of several public nancial institutions such as the Industrial Bank, the
Venezuelan Development Corporation (CVF), and the Venezuelan Corporation for the Development
of Small and Middle-Sized Industries (CORPOINDUSTRIA). These projects were nanced mainly
though tax revenues.11
In the second period, from 1974 to nowadays, the government signicantly expanded its interven-
tion in the economy. The main factor driving the increase in government intervention was the
disproportionate increase in revenues arising from the increase in oil prices and the nationalization
9See Baptista (2006).
10See Werz (1990). During the 1960s, the thinking of the Venezuelan political mainstream was oriented to promote
industries dierent than oil using scal revenues. In 1956, R omulo Betancourt, the main political actor of that period
and Venezuelan president from 1959 to 1964, pointed out that one of the main problems of Venezuela's economy was
its dependence from oil exports. He suggested that public policy had to be the driving force promoting structural
change in the economy. See Betancourt (1979).
11Private economic activity was further restricted during this time period since starting in 1962 until 1989 eco-
nomic rights were suspended and the government could enforce any control on economic activity without threat for
compensation.
5of the oil industry in 1976. Oil prices (in 2008 dollars) jumped from $43 per barrel in 1973 to $139
in 1974 and to more than $250 in 1980.12 The increase in oil prices generated not only an increase
in government revenues, but also expanded the capability of the public sector to get loans on inter-
national nancial markets. For instance, between 1973 and 1981 public-foreign debt increased from
7.7% to 14.4% of GDP. The larger in
uence of the government in the economy was exercised mainly
through an expansion of public enterprises, direct and indirect nancing of industrial projects, and
a wide array of controls on economic activity.
In 1975, an aggressive plan of industrialization based on mega-projects was adopted in industries
such as iron, steel, aluminum, and coal, in an attempt to diversify exports and to exploit the
comparative advantages that Venezuela supposedly had in the production of these goods. Even
though in 1974 the government created the Venezuelan Investment Fund (FIV) in order to isolate
the economy from the impact of oil-price shocks, FIV quickly became a major shareholder of public
rms in all areas of the economy. In 1970, state enterprises represented 3.2% of GDP whereas
in 1982 the proportion increased to 7.2% (29.4% including oil-industry public enterprises).13 The
government created and reinforced ocial agencies to lend money for specic projects at interest
rates well below market rates. An import-substitution policy was enacted by giving subsidies to
industries that would substitute for imports. In addition, the government implemented quotas
to private banks for lending money to a sector of \national" interest such as agriculture. The
government imposed generalized price controls of goods and services and maintained control on key
nancial prices such as interest rates and the exchange rate. Also, there were quotas in many sectors
and an average tari of approximately 80%. The eective rate of protection was more than 100%.14
The government imposed additional distortions by regulating the labor market and imposing ring
costs on rms.15
12The nominal price of oil increased from a historical $2 per barrel to $7 in 1974 and to more than $30 in the 80s.
13See Kelly (1986).
14See Hausmann (2001) for a detailed summary of Venezuela's economic policies.
15See Bermudez (2006) for a detailed documentation of labor policies.
6As a result of these interventions, the share of the public sector in total GDP increased from 15.4%
in 1973 to 30.3% in 1980. During the 1974 to 1980 period, employment in government oces as
a proportion of total employment increased by 4.2 percentage points. In 1970, public investment
represented 24% of total investment whereas in 1982 more than 67%. Relative to public investment,
investment by public enterprises represented 46% in 1970 and 81% in 1982.16 In 1983, for the rst
time, public investment was greater than private investment. Between 1977 and 1983, private
investment decreased by 78.3%. Investment per worker in 2000 was similar to that in 1955. Hence,
the government became the economy's main channel of resource allocation.
To summarize, between 1920 and 1958, the evolution of economic activity in Venezuela was de-
termined by a boom in the oil industry and oil-related activities such as the development of large
public infrastructure projects. This boom lead to a substantial process of capital accumulation and
knowledge transfer since at the time the oil industry was open to foreign direct investment. After
1958, a slow process of government intervention in all aspects of economic activity took place and
was accelerated after 1974, leading to substantial distortions in the economy. The most signicant
developments of the time being the nationalization of the oil industry in 1976 and the oil-price




We implement a standard development accounting exercise to inquire about the potential sources
of growth and collapse in relative GDP per capita in Venezuela since 1900. We rst decompose
16See for instance Hausmann (1985).
7GDP per capita into three components: labor productivity, employment to population ratio, and










where Y=P is GDP per capita, Y=nE is GDP per labor hour (labor productivity), E=P is the
employment to population ratio, and n is hours per worker. Relative GDP per capita for two













We use equation (1) to ask which of these three measurable components of the data explain the
evolution of GDP per capita in Venezuela relative to the United States.
We then further decompose labor productivity (GDP per hour) into several components which
include physical capital, human capital, and measured total factor productivity (TFP). To make




where A is total factor productivity (TFP), K is physical capital, and h is human capital per
































We use equation (3) to ask which factors: capital intensity, human capital, and TFP explain the
8evolution of labor productivity in Venezuela relative to the United States.
3.2 Growth Episode: 1920 to 1958
There is not enough data to do a complete accounting exercise during this period. Nevertheless, the
sparse evidence we have suggest that capital accumulation and knowledge transfer were important
and that hours and the employment ratio were not important. Venezuela appeared in the map as
an oil-producer country at the end 1922 with the bursting of the oil dwell El Barroso II in Cabimas
in the state of Zulia.17 El Barroso II showed the potential of Venezuela's oil industry. In 1922 the
production of oil reached 1.8 millions of barrels (mb). The combination of Venezuelan's oil resources
with the geographical advantage of being relatively close to the main export market explains why
in the following years oil production expanded at a very fast rate, surpassing 200 mb in 1942 and
reaching the highest level of 1,353 mb in 1967. (See Figure 2.) From 1920 to 1957, oil production
per capita increased at an annual average growth rate of 20.4 percent reaching the highest level
in 1957. (See Figure 3.) Notice that during this period of great expansion of the oil industry, oil
investment relative to non-oil investment was around 50 percent, reaching more than 70 percent in
the late 20s and 40s. (See Figure 4.) The overall investment rate during the 1920 to 1958 period
was an average of 27 percent. The expansion of the oil industry took place in the context were the
Venezuelan government granted oil concessions to foreign companies.
3.3 Collapse Episode: Since 1958
To understand the process of decline in standard of living starting around 1958, we use data from the
Conference Board (2010), Total Economy Database to inquire about the sources of this remarkable
17The rst oil concession in Venezuela was granted in 1865. However, the rst important oil eld (Mene Grande)
was discovered in 1914.
9relative decline. We perform a development accounting for 1960 and 2009 and nd that TFP and
capital accumulation represent substantial factors.
We start by looking at the factors related to labor supply dierences. In 1960, GDP per capita in
Venezuela relative to that of the United States was 82%. This dierence is almost all accounted
for by a dierence in the employment to population ratio. The dierence in labor productivity
(GDP per hour) and hours of work were negligible (about 3 to 4% higher in Venezuela), whereas
the employment to population ratio was 77% (.29 in Venezuela versus .38 in the United States).
Summarizing relative GDP per capita 1960:
(Y=P)V EN
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:
By 2009, relative GDP per capita declined to 32%. The employment to population ratio increases
both in Venezuela and the United States with the relative factor being 77% which is similar to
that observed in 1960. Relative hours of work are almost 11% higher in Venezuela (compared
to 4% higher in 1960). Hence, total labor supply (the combination of employment and hours) is
only 85% percent of that in the United States and this factor barely changes in 2009 compared to
1960.18 Instead, the low level of relative GDP per capita in Venezuela in 2009 is due to low relative
labor productivity and since relative labor supply is roughly constant, the fall in labor productivity
accounts for most of the observed decline in relative GDP per capita. Summarizing relative GDP
per capita 2009:
(Y=P)V EN
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:
We conclude that the fall in relative GDP per capita (and the low relative level observed nowadays)
18The relative total labor input changes from 0.80 in 1960 to 0.85 in 2009.
10is mostly a productivity problem!
We next investigate the factors behind the dierences in labor productivity. We construct stocks
of physical and human capital as follows. We use the investment rates in physical capital provided
by the Penn World Tables (see Heston, Summers, and Aten 2009) to construct stocks using the
perpetual inventory method.19 We use average years of schooling from Barro and Lee (2010) to
construct stocks of human capital using the basic specication of the Mincer returns to schooling
(see Bils and Klenow 2000). We use an average returns to schooling of 10 percent. In 1960, the
physical capital factor was 1.33 (the capital to output ratio was 3.6 in Venezuela versus 2.1 in the
United States) and the human capital factor 0.72 (an average of 3.1 years of schooling in Venezuela
versus 9.3 years in the United States). Hence, the TFP factor was 1.08. This implies a TFP
in Venezuela relative to that of the United States that was fairly similar (around 5% higher in
Venezuela). Summarizing relative GDP per hour in 1960:
(Y=nE)V EN
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By 2009, relative labor productivity falls to 38% of that in the United States. This low level of
relative labor productivity is accounted equally by a low relative TFP factor (0.61) and a low
relative factors (0.62). The fall in the contribution of factors is mostly due to a fall in the capital
to output ratio (from 3.6 in 1960 to 1.74 in 2009 in Venezuela whereas it increases from 2.1 to 2.6
in the United States, that is the capital to output ratio was 76% higher in Venezuela than in the
United States in 1960 and 33% lower in 2009). As a result, the drop in relative GDP per hour
in Venezuela is a combination of a fall in relative TFP and in capital accumulation. Summarizing
19We assume that economies were in steady state in 1950 (to construct the initial stock in 1950) and use the
investment rates from 1950 forward to trace the evolution of the physical capital stock. Alternative assumptions
about the initial capital stock which are common in the literature yield similar results.
11relative GDP per hour in 2009:
(Y=nE)V EN
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To summarize, the fall in relative GDP per hour in Venezuela is a combination of a TFP problem
and a capital accumulation problem. We estimate the TFP ratio to be negligible in 1960 and 0.72 in
2009. Since the fall in capital accumulation in Venezuela cannot be explained by direct distortions
to capital accumulation, we seek for an answer to the fall in TFP and capital accumulation that is
related to the same source, namely policy distortions that create misallocation.20
3.4 Potential Sources of Misallocation
There are three broad patterns that motivate our characterization of policies and institutions that
aected the allocation of resources, productivity, and capital accumulation in Venezuela. First,
there was an explicit policy-oriented movement of resource reallocation away from oil activities.
This process started as early as in the 1930s with in
uential thinkers and writers such as Arturo
Uslar Pietri promoting "sow the oil", a phrase often quoted in the context of a development policy
intended to diversify the economy.21 Productivity in the oil industry collapsed dramatically starting
in the late 60s as illustrated in Figure 5. Venezuela's share in the international oil market fell from
14.5 percent in 1961 to 5.5 percent in 1973.22 The evolution of Venezuela's in
uence in the world
market for oil is related to important changes in domestic policy and in the world market for
20We nd a negligible increase in the relative price of investment to consumption in Venezuela during this period
suggesting that aggregate distortions to invesment cannot explain the large fall in capital accumulation observed,
see Restuccia and Urrutia (2001) for the role of investment distortions in explaining capital accumulation across
countries.
21Arturo Uslar Pietri is a well-known Venezuelan writer that participated actively in political life. He was a former
interior minister and a candidate to the Venezuelan presidency in the elections of 1959.
22The share of Venezuela in the international oil market is only 2.9 percent in 2009.
12oil. Regarding Venezuela's domestic policy, there were new policy guidelines for the domestic oil
industry: preservation of oil reserves and increased scal participation. The preservation of reserves
implied the non-renewal of concessions. Increased scal participation was the rst step towards
the nationalization of the gas industry in 1971 and the oil industry in 1976.23 The changes in
domestic policy implied that during the 1960-1980 period the oil investment to total investment
ratio was below 10 percent, reaching the lowest level at 2.3 percent in 1976. Regarding the world
market for oil, there were new entrants in the export market for oil with higher quality and lower
cost of production, making the domestic oil industry less competitive and less attractive for foreign
investment, see Manzano (2007). In addition, the Organization of Petroleum Export Countries
(OPEC) was created in August 1960 with a focus on maintaining high oil prices at the cost of
market share.
Second, the rst boom in oil prices in 1974 generated substantial scal revenues to the government
which were quickly allocated by bureaucrats to a variety of investment projects. (See Figure 6 for
a time series of the price of oil.) For instance, the ratio of non-oil private to public investment
decreased from an average above 4 to less than 2 after the 80s (see Figure 7). The government
promoted big investment projects in iron, steel, aluminium, coal to supposedly diversify production
and exports. The behavior of the public sector in other oil-price shocks (for instance the 1979 and
2003-2007 price shocks) was similar in that there was an increase in the distortion to price signals
and an increasing presence of the public sector in the economy through the establishment of newly
created public enterprises and nationalizations.24 Third, regulation/policies that misallocate across
productive units, for instance, the reinforcement an industrial policy based on imports substitution,
and massive price controls that caused additional distortions to price signals.25
23The oil concessions of American and European companies would expire in 1983. Nationalization was not a source
of con
ict: the government had to pay compensation to the rms owning those rights.
24See Schmitz (2001) for an analysis of the negative impact of public enterprises on productivity and factor
accumulation.
25Economic rights were suspended in 1962. They were proclaimed in the 1961 Venezuelan Constitution and included
social rights such as education, health, and housing and civil liberties such as freedom of speech, association, and
press, right to fair trial, among others.
134 A Model of TFP
We consider a model of measured total factor productivity that follows closely that of Restuccia
and Rogerson (2008). The model builds from the industry equilibrium framework of Hopenhayn
(1992) embedded into a standard neoclassical growth model. The basic ingredient of the theory
is heterogeneity in total factor productivity across establishments. In the context of this model,
the allocation of factors of production across establishments leads to a role of policy distortions
on aggregate measured TFP dierences across countries. These policies may also lead to a decline
in capital accumulation. The model is extended along the lines of Restuccia (2009) to allow for
endogenous investment in productivity and hence giving a role for policy distortions to aect the
distribution of eciencies in the economy.
4.1 Economic Environment
Technology Dierently than in the standard neoclassical growth model, the unit of production









with capital services k and labor services n as factor inputs. The technology parameter s varies
across establishments but not over time and can take on a discrete and nite number of values,
s 2 S  fs1;:::;snsg. The other component of total factor productivity z is common across
establishments and is determined by an investment decision that we describe below. Establishments
are competitive in output and factor markets. An incumbent establishment with productivity zs
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We denote the optimal factor demands from this problem by  k(z;s) and  n(z;s). A relevant property
of these demand functions is that they are linear in (z;s). Hence, output at the establishment level
is liner in (z;s). It is easy to verify that (z;s) = (1 
)y(z;s) and so prots are also linear in (z;s).
We assume that incumbent establishments face an exogenous and constant probability of exit .
Exogenous exit realizations are iid across establishments and across time. Because establishment-






where  = 1 
1+R is the discount rate for the plant, R is a constant real interest rate, and  is the
exogenous exit rate. Note that since  is linear in (z;s), the value of an incumbent establishment
W is also linear in (z;s).
Entrants Entering establishments pay a set-up cost of ce measured in units of labor. After
paying this cost a realization of the establishment-level productivity parameter s is drawn from an
exogenous and time invariant distribution with cdf G(s) and pdf g(s). Entering establishments can
invest in the level of productivity z at a cost. We parameterize this cost function as
c(z) = Bz
; B > 0;  1:
An entrant chooses the level of productivity z to maximize the expected value of discounted prots









15where We is the value of an entering establishment and the maximization problem determines the
optimal level of productivity z which we denote by  z. We exploit the property of W being linear in z








Notice that  z is increasing in the (expected) value of an incumbent establishment and decreasing
in the cost of investment. There is a continuum of potential entrants that evaluate We relative to
the entry cost cew. We denote the mass of entry by E.
Preferences and Endowments There is an innitely-lived representative household with pref-





where Ct is consumption at date t and 0 <  < 1 is the discount factor. Households are endowed
with one unit of productive time in each period and K0 > 0 units of the capital stock at date 0. As
in the standard neoclassical growth model, the aggregate law of motion for capital is given by:
Kt+1 = (1   )Kt + Xt:
Feasibility The resource constraint for output is given by:
Ct + Xt + c(z)Et = Yt; (4)
where Ct is aggregate consumption, Xt is aggregate investment in physical capital, c(z) is the
investment cost in productivity z, Et is aggregate entry, and Yt is aggregate output. The demand




 k( z;s)(s); (5)
and the demand and supply of labor must be equal,
X
s
 n( z;s)(s) + Ece = 1; (6)
where  is the distribution of establishments in the economy.
4.2 Equilibrium
We focus on the steady-state competitive equilibrium of the model. In a steady-state equilibrium
the rental prices for labor and capital services are constant as well as all aggregates in the economy
including the distribution of establishments. The important aspect to keep in mind from the
consumer's problem is that the real interest rate in the economy is pinned down by preference
parameters and the depreciation rate of the capital stock, i.e., in steady state the real interest rate,
denoted by R, is given by




Denition of Equilibrium A steady-state competitive equilibrium with entry is a wage rate w,
a rental rate r, an aggregate distribution of establishments (s), a mass of entry E, value functions
W(z;s), (z;s), We, policy functions  k(z;s),  n(z;s),  z for individual establishments, and aggregate
levels of consumption C and capital K such that: (i) (Consumer optimization) r = 1=   (1   );
(ii) (Establishment optimization) Given prices (w;r), the functions , W, and We solve incumbent
and entering establishment's problems and  k,  n,  z are optimal policy functions; (iii) (Free-entry)





; 8s 2 S:
4.3 Calibration
We calibrate the model to data for the United States. The general strategy follows Cooley and
Prescott (1995) in calibrating the neoclassical growth model. A period in the model corresponds
to one year in the data. The discount factor is selected to match a real rate of return of 4 percent,
implying  = 0:96. The parameter controlling decreasing returns to scale at the establishment
is quantitatively important. We assume 
 = 0:85. Recent related studies have argued for values
around this level. Given this value, we select  to mach an income share of capital of 0.33. The
depreciation rate of capital  is chosen so that the capital to output ratio is equal to 2.35 as in the
U.S. economy, implying  = 0:10. The exit rate  is assumed to be 10 percent consistent with the
evidence of job destruction rates in Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1996) and exit rates of plants
in Tybout (2000).
In the economy with no distortions there is a simple mapping between establishment-level pro-
ductivity and employment. Hence, we choose the range of productivity to match the range of
employment levels in the data. With the lowest establishment productivity normalized to one, this
calibration implies that the highest productivity is 3.98.26 We use a log-spaced grid of establishment
productivity s with 100 points, i.e., ns = 100. The next step is to restrict the probability distri-
bution. We choose g(s) to match the distribution of establishments across employment sizes (see
Figure 8). For the cost function c(z), we set  = 2 and then choose B = 1 as a normalization. An
important property of the U.S. establishment data is that there is a large number of establishments
26The range of employment in the data is from 1 to 10,000 employees. Since n is linear in s, the range of s is the
same as employment. Relative TFP at the establishment level is given by s1 
.
18Table 1: Distribution of Establishments and Employment Size
Employment Size
Less than 5 Between 5 and 50 50 or more
Share of establishments (%) 56 39 5
Share of employment (%) 7 33 57
Share of output (%) 7 34 59
Average employment size 2 15 186
with a small number of workers and therefore these establishments account for a small share of the
employment in the economy. About 50 percent of the establishments have less than 10 employees
and these establishments account for only 15 percent of the employment, while only 2.6 percent
of establishments have more than 100 employees but account for 45 percent of the employment.
The benchmark economy broadly reproduces this pattern even though it was only calibrated to the
share of establishments in the data. Table 1 reports distributional statistics from the benchmark
economy. Table 2 summarizes the parameter values and targets for the calibrated economy.
Table 2: Calibration
Parameter Value Target
 0.28 Capital income share

 0.85 Literature
 0.96 Real rate of return
 0.10 Capital to output ratio
ce 1.0 Normalization
 0.1 Annual exit rate




We use the model as a framework to study productivity and capital accumulation in Venezuela.
We consider departures from the previous economic environment to accommodate two broad insti-
tutional and policy features of the Venezuelan economy after the 1960s, namely policy distortions
that induce reallocation away from productive activities and a high level of regulations and cost of
doing business.
The motivation for studying policy distortions that create misallocation comes from micro-level
studies and our own calculations using micro-level data for Venezuela that indicate that Venezuela
ranks among the countries with the highest levels of distortions in Latin America, a much higher
level than in the United States (see for instance Figure 9).27 To introduce policy distortions we follow
Restuccia and Rogerson (2008) by considering a general form of output taxes. We also consider
an experiment where the cost of investment in entry productivity diers by the factor indicated in
the Wold Bank (2010), Doing Business Database. According to Doing Business, Venezuela ranks
among the countries with the highest costs of setting up and starting a business, with an average
cost of 30 percent of GDP per capita whereas for the average OECD country this cost is only 5
percent. Table 3 summarizes the results.
Entry Costs To start, we consider an experiment where the entry-productivity cost is increased
by a factor of 6 relative to the benchmark economy.28 This factor dierence in the cost of entry
productivity is consistent with the actual cost of doing business in Venezuela relative to the average
of OECD countries according to World Bank data. The impact of this higher cost of entry produc-
tivity is re
ected in a lower level of  z, a level which is 36 percent of that in the benchmark economy.
27See also the detailed study of Latin American countries in Pages (2010).
28Recall that the entry-productivity cost is assumed to have the following form c(z) = Bz with B normalized to
1 in the benchmark economy. In the entry-cost experiment we increase B to 6.
20This lower level of entry productivity implies a TFP for the establishment that is 86 percent that
of the benchmark economy for a comparable establishment. Since entry costs apply to all entering
establishments, this policy does not produce any additional size distortions at the establishment
level and the aggregate eect of TFP is the one implied by the lower level of  z. Similarly, the higher
entry cost does not aect capital accumulation, leaving the capital to output ratio the same as in
the benchmark economy. A lower TFP translates into lower output per capita which is 80 percent
of that in the benchmark economy.29 Notice that in this experiment (as well as in the experiments
that will follow) the level of entry is the same as in the benchmark economy even though the real
wage rate is lower. While a lower wage rate encourages more labor demand by establishments, the
lower productivity discourages it and these eects cancel each other so aggregate entry remains the
same. As a result, the average establishment size is unaected by the higher cost of entry.30
Table 3: Results from Experiments
Relative to B.E.
Y TFP K=Y E w  z
Experiments:
(1) Entry cost 0.80 0.86 1.00 1.00 0.80 0.36
(2) Idiosyncratic distortions 0.67 0.85 0.72 1.00 0.48 0.70
(3) Both (1) and (2) 0.53 0.73 0.72 1.00 0.39 0.25
Note: (1) Entry cost is as in the benchmark economy (B.E.) except the parameter for
the entry-productivity cost B is set to 6 instead of 1 (6-fold increase). (2) Idiosyn-
cratic distortions is an output tax of 40 percent to establishments in the top 70% of
productivity distribution. (3) Refers to both entry cost and idiosyncratic distortions.
Idiosyncratic Distortions We introduce policy distortions as follows. We impose an output
tax of 40 percent to establishments in the top 70% of the productivity distribution while the
29Note that while in this experiment relative TFP is 0.85, relative output per capita is 0.80. The larger eect on
output per capita is due to the impact of lower TFP on the capital stock, however, lower TFP in this experiment
does not change the capital to output ratio.
30This is in contrast to alternative models of the cost of entry that abstract from investment in entry productivity
that predict a decline in aggregate entry and therefore an increase in average establishment size.
21remaining establishments are neither taxed nor subsidized. This particular policy conguration is
motivated by the evidence from micro data of manufacturing establishments in Venezuela. We use
data on manufacturing plants drawn from the Venezuelan Industrial Survey (Encuesta Industrial
de Venezuela). This is an annual survey of manufacturing conducted by the Venezuelan Statistics
Agency: Instituto Nacional de Estad stica (INE).31 Using these data we calculate productivity
at the plant level and from the rst order conditions of establishments in the model the implied
levels of output and capital taxes. Essentially, the model implies that establishments with dierent
productivity should demand factors to equalize both the capital to labor ratio and the marginal
product of capital to some optimal levels. Hence, we infer taxes (wedges) from departures of these
optimal conditions. We nd that tax rates on output are around 40 percent for the top 70%
of establishments.32 We also nd that there are no substantial dierences in the capital taxes
across establishments (taxes that distort the capital labor ratio across establishments). While the
impact of this policy on the entry productivity is weaker than in the previous experiment with
entry costs ( z is 70 percent of the benchmark economy versus of 36 percent), the aggregate eect
on TFP is as large (0.85 versus 0.86). The lower TFP re
ects two eects in this experiment: a
lower establishment-entry productivity (0.95) and a reallocation across establishments (from high to
low productivity establishments) that induces a drop in productivity (0.89). Hence, misallocation
explains 70 percent of the low TFP in this experiment and low entry productivity explains the
remaining 30 percent. Whereas in the economy with high entry costs distributional statistics are as
in the benchmark, policy distortions induce a reallocation across establishments. Establishments
with 5 to 50 employees produce 60 percent of the output compared to 34 percent in the benchmark
31The survey covers manufacturing plants that employ at least ve individuals and collects detailed information
on plant characteristics such as geographic location, manufacturing industry, production, value added, employment,
intermediate inputs and investment. The survey also reports the book value of xed capital at the beginning of the
year which we use as the capital stock. We use data corresponding to the year 2000.
32We nd that for the bottom 30% of establishments only the bottom 10% feature a negative output tax (a
subsidy). However, the level of output subsidy is not consistent with the observed low employment size of these
establishments. Hence, we think that the implied output subsidies are keeping these low productivity establishments
in business, a feature that is not present in our model. In fact, the productivity gap between the top and bottom
deciles in the data is much larger than that in the United States and hence our calibrated economy. As a result, we
ignore these subsidies in the experiment.
22economy and large establishments (those with more than 50 employees) produce 35 percent of the
output compared to 60 percent in the benchmark. Contrary to the entry cost experiment, policy
distortions also induce a drop in capital accumulation, with the capital to output ratio being 72
percent of the benchmark economy.
Entry Costs and Idiosyncratic Distortions Experiment (3) in Table 3 combines the entry
cost and policy distortions experiments as described previously. The eects on TFP, capital ac-
cumulation, and output per capita are quite substantial and account for a large portion of the
observed dierences in these variables in Venezuela relative to the United States in the collapse
period. Aggregate TFP drops to 73 percent of the benchmark economy. Note that in 2009 the
implied TFP ratio between Venezuela and the United States is 0.72. Hence, this experiment ac-
counts for 96 percent (log(0.73)/log(0.72)) of the dierence in measured TFP between Venezuela
and the United States in 2009. Similarly, the experiment explains 82 percent of the dierence in
the capital to output ratio between Venezuela and the United States in 2009 (log(0.72)/log(0.67)).
The experiment explains 92 percent of the dierence in output per capita between Venezuela and
the United States in 2009 (log(0.53)/log(0.50)).33
6 Conclusions
We showed that GDP per capita in Venezuela increased dramatically relative to that of the United
States from 20 percent in 1920 to 90 percent in 1958, but then collapsed to around 30 percent
nowadays. In a development accounting exercise, we argued that the growth period is mainly
accounted for by an increase in capital accumulation and knowledge transfer associated with foreign
33The calculation for GDP per capita in the data abstracts from the human capital factor that is not present in
the model. Without the human capital factor, the ratio of GDP per capita in the data between Venezuela and the
United States is 0.50 (0.38/0.76).
23investment in the booming oil industry whereas the collapse period is accounted for equally by a
fall in total factor productivity and in capital accumulation. To understand the episode of collapse,
we extended a model of heterogenous establishments in Restuccia and Rogerson (2008) to allow for
endogenous investment in entry-level productivity. We showed that, in the context of this model,
policies and institutions that favour unproductive in detriment of more productive activities can
generate substantial negative eects in TFP and in capital accumulation. In particular, we nd
that reasonable idiosyncratic policies and entry costs can account for between 80 to 95 percent of
the lower capital accumulation, TFP, and GDP per capita observed in Venezuela relative to the
United States in the collapse period. Removing the barriers that aect business investment and
create misallocation across productive activities can substantially increase income per capita in
Venezuela.
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28Figure 1: Relative GDP per Capita in Venezuela









































29Figure 2: Oil Production in Venezuela













































30Figure 3: GDP and Oil Production per capita
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31Figure 4: Oil to Non-Oil Investment Ratio




































32Figure 5: Labor Productivity in the Oil Industry










































33Figure 6: Price of Oil









































34Figure 7: Private to Public Investment Ratio (Non-Oil)




















































35Figure 8: Size Distribution of Establishments
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Source: Author's calculations (Chile, Venezuela);  IDB, 2010 (Colombia, Mexico, El Salvador, Uruguay, Bolivia, Ecuador, Argentina, China and US )
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